Social Security Expectations and Retirement Savings Decisions by Jeff Dominitz et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










This research was supported in part by National Institute on Aging Grant 2 P01 AG10179-04A1 and National
Science Foundation grant SES-0001436. We are grateful to the University of Wisconsin Survey Center for
enabling collection of the telephone survey data and to Jora Stixrud for assistance in performance of the face-
to-face survey. We have benefited from the comments of participants in seminars at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Northwestern University, and the University of Pennsylvania; participants in the TMR Savings
and Pensions Workshop held August 2001 in Evian, France; and participants in the Conference on Survey
Research on Household Expectations and Preferences held November 2001 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
' 2002 by Jeff Dominitz, Charles F. Manski and Jordan Heinz.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
' notice, is given to the source.Social Security Expectations and Retirement Savings Decisions
Jeff Dominitz, Charles F. Manski and Jordan Heinz
NBER Working Paper No. 8718
January 2002
JEL No. H55, D84, E2
ABSTRACT
Retirement savings decisions should depend on expectations of Social Security retirement
income. Persons may be uncertain of their future Social Security benefits for several reasons, including
uncertainty about their future labor earnings, the formula now determining social security benefits, and
the future structure of the Social Security system. To learn how Americans perceive their benefits, we
have elicited Social Security expectations from respondents to the Survey of Economic Expectations. We
have also performed a more intensive face-to-face survey on a small sample of respondents. This paper
presents the empirical findings. It also illustrates how data on expectations may help predict how Social
Security policy affects retirement savings.
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Retirement savings decisions in the United States should depend on expectations of 
Social Security retirement income.  Persons may be uncertain of their future Social Security 
benefits for several reasons, including uncertainty about their future labor earnings, the formula 
now determining social security benefits, and the future structure of the Social Security system.  
Structural uncertainty is particularly pertinent today, as Congress and the President contemplate 
possibly radical revision of a Social Security system declared by President Bush’s Commission 
to Strengthen Social Security to have “reached retirement age.”
1  Some proposed revisions, 
notably those calling for private investment of OASDI taxes, could increase uncertainty about 
future benefits. Other proposals, notably those calling for the government to create a “Social 
Security lockbox” of guaranteed benefits, could reduce uncertainty.  The Social Security 
Administration (SSA) calls the public’s attention to the possibility of future change in its 
document The Future of Social Security, which begins: “Will Social Security be there for you?  
Absolutely.  The only real question is what kind of Social Security system we will have.”
 2 
Although uncertainty about Social Security benefits should be widespread, there is reason 
to think that the degree and nature of this uncertainty varies systematically across the population.  
Under the existing formula with a benefit cap, older workers with histories of consistently high 
levels of earnings should face less uncertainty about their benefits levels than do those with 
                                                 
 
1  Richard W. Stevenson, New York Times, July 20, 2001. 
 
2 Social Security Administration Publication No. 05-10055, August 2000. http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10055.html 
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histories of fluctuating earnings.
3  Younger workers should face more labor earnings uncertainty 
than older workers, and also more uncertainty about the future structure of the system. 
  Research aiming to understand the impact of Social Security policy on retirement savings 
decisions has been hampered by a dearth of empirical evidence on Social Security expectations.  
Respondents to the Retirement History Survey and to the Health and Retirement Study have 
provided point forecasts of their future benefits (see Bernheim, 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 
1999, 2001).  However, respondents’ uncertainty about their benefits has not been measured.  
Nor have attempts been made to learn the process by which persons form their expectations. 
  Beginning in 1999, we have elicited probabilistic expectations of Social Security 
retirement benefits from respondents to our national Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE), 
which has been ongoing since 1993 (see Dominitz and Manski, 1997a, 1997b).  Moreover, in the 
summer of 2001, we performed a more intensive face-to-face survey on a small sample of 
respondents.  This paper presents the empirical findings. 
  To frame the relevant issues in a simple yet rigorous manner, Section 2 poses an idealized 
model of retirement savings.  Section 3 describes the data on Social Security expectations that 
we have collected in the SEE and in the face-to-face survey.  Section 4 reports our findings.  
Section 5 uses the decision model of Section 2 and the empirical findings of Section 4 to 
simulate how Social Security policy may affect retirement savings.  Section 6 draws conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Expectations of benefits under the existing Social Security system may be influenced by the annual statements that 
workers now receive from the Social Security Administration.  Beginning in October 1999, SSA has mailed workers 
of age 25 and older annual point estimates of their prospective benefits.  Previously, a Personal Earnings and Benefit 
Estimate Statement had been available on request since 1988.   See Section 4.2 for further discussion.  3
2. A Simple Model of Retirement Savings 
 
Optimal Savings Decisions in a Two-Period World 
An idealized two-period model makes evident the role of Social Security expectations as 
a determinant of retirement savings.  Suppose that a person lives for two periods, working in the 
first period and retiring in the second.  In the first period, the person receives labor earnings and 
other income Y1 > 0, which he must allocate between consumption  and retirement savings.   
Savings may be invested in part in a mutual fund, with uncertain real rate of return, and in part in 
a risk-free asset.  Let S
m ≥  0 denote savings in the mutual fund and S
f ≥  0 denote risk-free 
savings.  In the second period, the person consumes his Social Security retirement benefit Y2 ≥  0 





m is the realized rate of return on the mutual 
fund and r
f is the risk-free rate of return.  Thus, consumption in the two periods must satisfy the 
budget constraints 
 
C1  = Y1  -  S
m  - S
f 






The utility associated with consumption of the bundle (C1, C2) is U(C1) + β U(C2), where β  is the 
discount rate. 
Suppose that, when facing the consumption-savings decision in the first period, the 
person knows his contemporaneous income Y1, but does not know either his future Social 
Security benefit Y2 or the return r
m on the mutual fund.  Suppose that he forms a subjective  4
distribution P(Y2, r
m) and acts to maximize expected utility.  Then, in the first period, the person 
chooses retirement savings to solve the problem 
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Thus, a person’s retirement savings decision depends on his first-period income Y1, his 
preferences [U(.), β ], and his expectations P(Y2, r
m) of Social Security benefits and mutual fund 
returns. 
 
Social Security Policy and Expectations 
In the context of this model, social security policy affects the retirement savings decision 
by influencing the person’s expectations.  Policy changes could easily affect the joint distribution 
P(Y2, r
m), but it is perhaps easiest to speculate on the changes to the marginal distribution P(Y2). 
Consider creation of a “Social Security Lockbox” that guarantees future benefits to 
persons now working.  Such a guarantee would presumably reduce the size of the left tail of 
P(Y2), as workers are relieved of the present-day concern with a catastrophic collapse of the 
Social Security system.  However, the specific effect of the policy change on expectations would 
likely depend on the nature of the government guarantee.  A government commitment to 
maintain present benefit levels may well have different effects on expectations than would a 
guarantee of some minimum benefit level. 
Revision of the Social Security system to include private investment of a portion of 
OASDI taxes in a personal retirement account would change Social Security from a system of  5
defined benefits to one with a defined-contribution component.  When considering private 
pensions, it is commonly thought that such a change should increase the dispersion of benefit 
expectations and move their central tendency rightward.  However, the effect on Social Security 
expectations may well depend on the specific form of the private-investment component and on 
other considerations.  For example, Merton (1983) notes that a system combining defined 
benefits and defined contributions may yield a smaller total risk than a system of defined benefits 
alone or one of defined contributions alone.  Feldstein and Liebman (2001) cite diversification as 
a leading argument offered by advocates of a mixed system.  
 
The Need for Empirical Evidence on Expectations 
A recent NBER volume on the risk aspects of investment-based Social Security reforms 
(Campbell and Feldstein, 2001) highlights the role of benefit expectations.  Yet this volume 
contains no direct empirical evidence on these expectations.  McHale (2001) attempts to infer the 
“political risks” of defined benefit systems from international evidence on changes in benefit 
rules. Campbell et al. (2001) connect defined-benefit uncertainty to labor income uncertainty 
through the Social Security benefit formula. Feldstein et al. (2001) suppose that defined benefits 
are known with certainty and use historical data on the performance of a diversified portfolio of 
securities to assess the financial risks of an investment-based system.  
In the absence of empirical evidence, one can only speculate about how changes in Social 
Security policy would affect expectations, and thence retirement savings.  A natural first step in 
assembling the necessary empirical evidence is to learn the expectations that Americans 
presently hold for Social Security benefits.  This is the purpose of the surveys described in 
Section 3.  6
 
 
3. Eliciting Expectations of Social Security Benefits 
 
3.1. The Survey of Economic Expectations 
 
  The Survey of Economic Expectations, a periodic module in a continuous national 
telephone survey conducted by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center, was begun in 1993 
and has been ongoing since then.  Dominitz and Manski (1997a, 1997b), Dominitz (1998, 2001), 
and Manski and Straub (2000) describe the survey design and report findings on expectations of 
income, job loss, and other outcomes one year into the future. 
Beginning in 1999, the survey has included a series of questions eliciting expectations of 
Social Security benefits from persons of ages 18 - 69. This part of the survey begins with a brief 
description of the Social Security program and a request for the respondent to predict his 
eligibility for benefits when he is 70 years old, as follows:
4 
Politicians and the news media have been talking recently about the future of the Social 
Security retirement system, the federal program providing benefits to retired workers. 
The amount of benefits for which someone is eligible is currently determined by the 
person’s retirement age and by earnings prior to retirement. There has been much 
discussion of changing the form of the Social Security system, so the future shape of the 
system is not certain. 
 
                                                 
4 These introductory instructions are intended to stimulate the respondent to consider the range of possible 
outcomes. It is possible that the instructions convey information that respondents use to form expectations. 
Assessment of such effects based on systematic experimentation with alternative sets of instructions is a worthy 
subject for future research.  7
With this in mind, I would like you to think about what kind of Social Security retirement 
benefits will be available when you are older. In particular, think ahead to when you are 
about to turn 70 years old and suppose that you are not working at that time. 
 
What is the PERCENT CHANCE that you will be eligible to collect any Social Security 
retirement benefits at that time? 
 
Respondents who report a positive probability are then asked a series of questions 
designed to elicit their subjective distribution of benefits, conditional on eligibility.  This series 
follows the format of the income-expectations questions that have been asked in SEE since its 
inception (see Dominitz and Manski, 1997a).  That is, respondents are first asked to report the 
lowest and highest possible levels of their future benefits.  The responses are then used to set 




Suppose you are eligible to collect Social Security benefits when you turn 70. Please 
think about how much money you would be eligible to collect EACH YEAR. When 
considering the dollar value, please ignore the effects of inflation or cost-of-living 
increases. That is, please respond as if a dollar today is worth the same as a dollar when 
you turn 70. 
 
What do you think is the LOWEST amount of social security benefits, per year, that you 
would be eligible to receive? 
What do you think is the HIGHEST amount of social security benefits, per year, that you 
would be eligible to receive?
                                                 
5 Instructing respondents to ignore inflation in the introductory statement below is potentially important, because we 
are asking respondents to forecast as much as fifty-two years into the future.  Similar instructions were given to 
respondents in our exploratory study of student expectations of the returns to schooling (Dominitz and Manski, 
1996).  8
 
What is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you would be eligible to receive 
over ${Y},000 of Social Security benefits per year, when you turn 70? 
 
The responses to these questions may be used to estimate person-specific subjective 
probability distributions of benefit levels, conditional on eligibility for benefits.
6  I n  
combination with the reported probability of eligibility, we may estimate subjective 
unconditional distributions of benefits.
7 
 
3.2. Face-To-Face Interview 
 
The more intensive face-to-face interviews were designed to complement the national 
telephone survey.  A random sample of staff members at a midwestern university were asked 
essentially the same questions as the SEE respondents, plus additional open-ended questions 
intended to explore how they went about forming their expectations.
8  In particular, following the 
questions eliciting expectations of Social Security benefits, respondents were asked 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
6  As in Dominitz and Manski (1997a), we use a least-squares criterion to fit person-specific log-normal distributions 
to the responses to the sequence of probabilistic questions. 
 
7 For respondents who report a zero probability of eligibility, the unconditional distribution is necessarily degenerate 
at $0.  We do not elicit conditional probabilities of benefit levels from respondent who reported a zero chance of 
eligibility.  These respondents are instead posed an open-ended question asking why there is “no chance you will be 
eligible to collect any Social Security retirement benefits.” 
 
8 The one difference between the questions in SEE and in the face-to-face interviews concerned the thresholds for 
the probabilistic questions on benefit levels.  The CATI software used in SEE enables application of a person-
specific branching algorithm, but this was difficult to implement with the pencil-and-paper format of the face-to-
face interviews.  Hence the same thresholds, ranging from $5,000 to $25,000, were posed to all respondents. 
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Having answered these questions, please describe as best you can the considerations you 
had in mind when you were attempting to predict your Social Security retirement 
benefits. 
 
The interview also includes a new segment eliciting perceptions of the current maximum 
annual Social Security benefit.  Following an introductory statement, respondents were asked for 
their subjective probabilities of the maximum benefit exceeding various thresholds and then for a 
best point estimate.
9  The segment closed with two open-ended questions.  Here is the text: 
 
Now think about Social Security benefits today.  In particular, imagine a person who is 
now 70 years old.  Suppose that this person retired from work at age 65 and began 
collecting benefits after working full time for 40 years.  Suppose that, while working, this 
person had high enough income to be eligible for the maximum Social Security benefit 
that is currently paid. 
 
What is the PERCENT CHANCE that this person currently receives over ${Y},000 of 
Social Security benefits per year? 
 
If you had to choose one number, what would be your best estimate of the benefits that 
this person receives per year? 
 
Describe as best you can the current system that the government now uses to determine 
social security benefits.  What are the main factors in calculating the size of the benefit?  
And so on. 
 
                                                 
9 SEE elicits subjective probabilities only on the occurrence of future events, not on the value of objective quantities 
such as the current maximum Social Security benefit.  However, the Bayesian idea that persons express uncertainty 
through subjective probabilities applies equally well to objective quantities and to future events.  10
When thinking about the previous question, please describe as best you can the sources 
from which you drew your information.   

The interview concludes with a sequence of questions about expected income at age 70 
from sources other than Social Security.  Respondents report up to six probabilities 
corresponding to threshold values ranging from $10,000 to $100,000.  An open-ended question 
concerning how these expectations were formed is asked as well.  We do not analyze these data 
in this paper. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
4.1. SEE Data 
 
Sample Size, Response Rates, and Response Patterns 
The analysis in this paper is based on the 1651 SEE interviews completed from July 
1999, when the Social Security questions were introduced, through April 2001.  Of the 1651 
respondents, 1425 were age-eligible (i.e., under 70) for the Social Security questions.  Of these, 
1377 reported their chance of eligibility for benefits at age 70; thus the response rate to the 
eligibility question was 0.97.  Of these 1377 persons, 145 reported zero chance of receiving 
benefits.  Hence 1232 persons were asked the questions eliciting lowest and highest possible 
benefits and the probabilities of benefits exceeding specified thresholds, conditional on 
eligibility.  Of these 1232 persons, 790 gave responses that could be used to estimate person-
specific subjective distributions; thus the response rate to this sequence of questions was 0.64.  In  11
all, we have unconditional subjective distributions of benefits for 935 (145 + 790) persons.  Our 
analysis focuses on these respondents, who constitute 0.66 of the age-eligible SEE sample 
members. 
The overall response rate of 0.66 to the sequence of Social Security expectations 
questions is considerably lower than those that we have experienced asking SEE respondents to 
forecast simple binary events (typically 0.95 or more) and somewhat lower than our experience 
eliciting income expectations one-year-ahead (typically 0.80).  Over 85.5 percent (378 out of 
442) of the non-response occurs when respondents do not report lowest/highest possible benefits. 
Another 8.4 percent did not respond to all of the probability questions asked, and the remaining 
6.1 percent gave complete reports that could not be used to estimate person-specific subjective 
distributions. 
With one-third of the sample having at least partially missing data, it is important to 
understand the cross-sectional pattern of response to the degree possible.  Table 1 shows that 
respondents and non-respondents have the same mean age.  However, non-respondents are 
somewhat more likely to be female, less likely to be non-Hispanic whites, less likely to be labor 
force participants, and less likely to be high school or college graduates. 
Figure 1 presents a kernel-smoothed estimate of the probability of non-response 
conditional on age.  The figure shows a non-monotone pattern.  The estimated non-response rate 
falls from a maximum of about 0.45 at age 21 to a minimum of about 0.25 at age 34.  It then 
rises to a second maximum of about 0.42 at age 57 and falls again to about 0.25 at age 69.  We 
have no ready explanation for this age pattern. 
 
Comparison with HRS Response Rates  12
  The rate of non-response to the SEE Social Security questions, while troubling to some 
degree, compares favorably with the rate of non-response to Social Security expectations 
questions posed in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS questions were asked only 
of the most “financially knowledgeable” member of the household, and then only if this person 
was not receiving benefits at the time of interview.  Each such respondent was first asked if he or 
she expects to receive a benefit “at some time in the future.”  If the response is “yes,” the 
respondent is asked the expected age of inception of benefits (i.e., retirement age) and the 
expected amount of benefits “in today’s dollars” conditional on receipt at that age.  The exact 
wording of the HRS questions is appended to this paper, as is a graphical depiction of the 
comparison of response rates. 
In the year 2000 survey, 4337 HRS respondents born after 1930 (i.e., under 70) were 
asked the yes/no expectations question, and 3745 said “yes.”  Of these, 3565 reported a valid 
retirement age, but only 2412 reported the expected level of benefits.  Thus, information on the 
expected level of benefits was obtained from only 0.56 (2412/4337) of the respondents queried 
about their Social Security expectations.
10   
  Although differences in sampling frames and question sequences preclude precise 
comparison of the HRS and SEE response rates, we think that the difference stems largely from 
the HRS practice of eliciting expected benefit levels only from respondents who answer “yes” to 
                                                 
10 Other evidence on HRS response rates has been reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (1999, 2001), who analyze 
the Social Security expectations data collected in the 1992 interview.  They report a response rate of 0.49 among 
those who (1) say “yes” to the eligibility question, regardless of age, (2) give permission to link Social Security 
Administration (SSA) data on their earnings histories, and (3) actually have their records linked (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2001).  Approximately three-fourths of HRS respondents are said to satisfy the latter two criteria.   
Hence, about two-thirds of those who responded “yes” to the eligibility question and who had linkable records 
reported an expected level of benefits. 
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the eligibility question.
11  We have more to say about this below. 
 
Eligibility Expectations 
Among the 1377 SEE respondents who report a valid probability of eligibility for 
benefits at age 70, the mean subjective probability of eligibility is 0.57 and the median is 0.60.  
Figure 2 presents kernel-smoothed quantiles of eligibility probabilities conditional on age.  The 
overall pattern is striking, with older respondents tending to report much higher probabilities of 
eligibility than do younger ones.  For example, the estimated median probability of eligibility is 
0.40 at age 30, 0.50 at age 40, 0.75 at age 50, 0.95 at age 60, and 1.00 at age 65.  Thus, older 
Americans tend to be almost certain that, in one form or another, the Social Security system will 
survive at least ten more years.  However, younger Americans have no such confidence in the 
continuation of the system until their retirement. 
The first two columns of Table 2 present least absolute deviations (LAD) estimates of 
best linear predictors that describe the cross-sectional variation of eligibility probabilities with 
demographic and economic covariates of the respondents. The estimates in the first column of 
the table are based on the 1277 SEE respondents who report their eligibility probability and 
covariates, while those in the second column are based on the smaller sample of 871 respondents 
who answer the entire sequence of expectations questions.  Clearly age is the dominant predictor 
variable; in both samples, the predicted chance of eligibility for benefits increases by about one 
and one-half percentage points for every one-year increase in age.  The other covariates have 
                                                 
11 SEE respondents are adults who live in households with telephones, while respondents to the HRS Social Security 
expectations questions are “financially-knowledgeable” individuals who are not receiving Social Security and live in 
households satisfying HRS age restrictions. 
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relatively little predictive power. 
 
Comparison with HRS Eligibility Expectations 
  It is of interest to juxtapose the SEE and HRS eligibility questions and to compare the 
responses.  The respective questions are: 
 
SEE: Think ahead to when you are about to turn 70 years old and suppose that you are 
not working at that time.  What is the PERCENT CHANCE that you will be eligible to 
collect any Social Security retirement benefits at that time? 
 
HRS: Do you expect to receive Social Security benefits at some time in the future? 
 
The questions and samples of respondents differ in several respects, but the main 
distinction is that the SEE question asks for a subjective probability while the HRS one asks for a 
yes/no response.  Focusing on this distinction and abstracting from the others, responses to the 
two questions may be compared if we suppose that respondents asked the HRS question report 
best point predictions of benefit eligibility, obtained by minimizing the expected value of some 
symmetric loss function.  As pointed out in Manski (1990), each respondent will answer “yes” if 
his or her subjective probability of eligibility exceeds a threshold that depends on the loss 
function and “no” if this probability is below the threshold.  If the loss function is symmetric, the 
threshold probability is 0.5.  So a SEE respondent with subjective probability above 0.5 would 
report “yes” if asked the HRS question and one with subjective probability below 0.5 would 
report “no.” 
Figure 3 presents the actual fraction of HRS respondents of different ages who answer  15
“yes” to the HRS eligibility question.  The figure applies the reasoning of the paragraph above to 
estimate the fraction of SEE respondents who would have reported “yes” if they had been asked 
the HRS question.
12  Comparison of the two plots shows that they are quite close to one another 
at all ages; the maximum deviation is only 0.05. 
This suggests that HRS respondents who report “yes” may reasonably be interpreted as 
having subjective eligibility probabilities in the range [0.5, 1] and those who report “no” as 
having probabilities in the range [0, 0.5].  This interpretation calls into question the HRS practice 
of not eliciting expected benefit levels from those who report “no.”  Such persons, particularly 
those with non-negligible subjective probabilities of eligibility, may have well-formed beliefs 
regarding the benefits they would receive conditional on being eligible. 
 
Expectations of Benefit Levels: Central Tendency 
  For each of the 790 SEE respondents with complete expectations data and a positive 
subjective probability of eligibility for benefits, we fit a person-specific log-normal distribution 
to the elicited probabilities that benefits exceed different thresholds.  A succinct way to 
characterize these subjective distributions is through their medians, to express the central 
tendencies of respondents’ expectations, and their interquartile ranges, to express respondents’ 
uncertainty.  In what follows, m denotes the median of a person’s fitted log-normal distribution 
and q denotes its interquartile range.
13 
                                                 
12 The estimates based on SEE data are kernel-smoothed.  The HRS sample is large enough to eliminate the need for 
smoothing, so the actual year-by-year data are plotted.  The HRS plot includes persons who currently receive 
benefits and assumes that such persons would have responded “yes” had they been asked the eligibility question. 
Among those who do not report “yes” are 741 respondents who report “no” and 80 who report “don’t know.” 
 
13 It has been traditional in the literature on consumption and savings to measure central tendency and uncertainty 
by the mean and variance of subjective log-income.  We could transform our elicited Social Security benefit  16
The cross-sectional median value of m across the sample of 790 respondents is $10,046.  
According to SSA records, the average monthly benefit received in March 2001 by all 
beneficiaries age 65 or older was $817, which equates to $9804 annually.
14  Among retired 
workers over age 65, the average benefit in March 2001 was $854, or $10,248 on an annual 
basis.  These average figures for persons over 65 are not directly comparable to our cross-
sectional median of m for benefits at age 70.  However, the close correspondence of values does 
indicate that respondents have a reasonable general sense of the benefits they would receive, 
conditional on eligibility. 
  Figure 4 presents kernel-smoothed 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75-quantile regressions of m on age. 
Observe that the 0.25-quantile rises from about $2,500 to $5,000 as age increases from 20 to 35 
and then remains close to $5,000 as age increases from 35 to 69.  The 0.50-quantile dwells in the 
range $7,000 - $10,000 for persons of age 22-35 and then in the range $10,000 - $12,000 for 
persons older than 35.  The 0.75-quantile remains between $15,000 - $20,000 for all persons 
older than 21. 
The main impression that we draw from Figure 4 is that the central tendencies of persons’ 
expectations of benefit levels vary relatively little with age.  In contrast, Figure 2 showed that 
expectations of eligibility rise dramatically with age.  Juxtaposing these findings, we conclude 
that younger persons tend to be much less confident than older ones that Social Security will 
continue to exist when they retire but, conditional on continued existence of the system, they 
                                                                                                                                                             
expectations into expectations of log-benefits, but we see no good reason to do so.  Characterization of the central 
tendency and uncertainty by the subjective median and interquartile range of benefits seems to us much more natural 
and informative. 
 
14 See Table 1.B3 appended to this paper. Available at http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/cos/pdf/2000/1b3.pdf.  
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tend to expect that benefits will remain near current levels. 
  Figure 4 also makes plain that expectations of benefit levels vary substantially among 
persons of any given age.  For example, the interquartile range of m is about $15,000 ($20,000 - 
$5000) at age 40 and about $13,000 ($18,000 - $5,000) at age 60.  This heterogeneity in 
expectations presumably reflects a combination of real and perceptual factors.  On the real side, 
the current system makes benefits vary with a person’s own earnings and, in the case of survivor 
benefits, with the earnings of spouses; hence expectations should vary with personal and spousal 
past and expected labor earnings.  On the perceptual side, persons may vary in their knowledge 
of how the Social Security system currently operates and in their expectations for the future 
structure of the system. 
  The third column of Table 3 presents LAD estimates of best linear predictors that 
describe the cross-sectional variation of m with various demographic and economic covariates of 
the respondents.  Echoing Figure 4, we find that m varies little with age, increasing by only $66 
for every one-year increase in age.  The variation with gender and schooling is more pronounced.  
Conditioning on other covariates, the predicted value of m is almost $3,000 less for a women 
than for a man.  This finding meshes nicely with current differences in benefits; Table 1.B3 
shows that the average monthly benefit received in March 2001 by beneficiaries age 65 or older 
was $232 higher for men than for women, which equates to a difference of $2,784 annually.  
Conditioning on other covariates, individuals with schooling beyond high school are predicted to 
have subjective medians more than $2,000 dollars higher than are individuals with no such 
schooling.  This variation in expected benefits may reasonably arise from variation with 
schooling in life-cycle earnings streams. 
  18
Expectations of Benefit Levels: Uncertainty 
  Across the sample of 790 SEE respondents with complete expectations data and a 
positive probability of eligibility for benefits, the cross-sectional median of the subjective 
interquartile range q is $7,049.  Figure 5 presents kernel-smoothed 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75-quantile 
regressions of q on age.  The figure shows that subjective uncertainty about the magnitude of 
Social Security benefits is very substantial among young persons but decreases continuously 
with age.  The 0.25-quantile of q dwells near $5,000 up to age 52 and then falls to zero by age 
57.  The 0.50-quantile falls steadily from more than $15,000 at age 20 to zero at age 67.  The 
0.75-quantile falls very sharply (roughly from $38,000 to $20,000) from age 20 to 25, and 
continues to fall steadily thereafter, reaching a limit of about $5,000 at age 69. 
That uncertainty about benefit levels should decrease with age makes much sense, 
because uncertainty about future labor earnings and about the future structure of Social Security 
should decrease as retirement nears.  However, we take the main message of Figure 5 to be that 
even middle-aged persons who are nearing retirement tend to be rather uncertain of their future 
benefit levels, conditional on eligibility.  For example, the median value of q is $8,000 among 
respondents of age 55, who are typically only ten years from retirement.
15 
The final column of Table 3 presents LAD estimates of best linear predictors that 
describe the cross-sectional variation of q with various demographic and economic covariates of 
                                                 
15 Analyzing the point expectations of future benefits elicited in the HRS, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999, 2001) 
conclude that respondents tend to misperceive the magnitude of the benefits they will receive.  The pervasive 
uncertainty that SEE respondents reveal when questioned probabilistically makes us think that this conclusion is 
premature.  We simply do not know how respondents who are uncertain of their future benefits choose point values 
when queried.  Continuing the reasoning applied earlier to elicitation of eligibility, it may be that a person asked to 
provide a point prediction of his or her benefit level chooses a value that minimizes expected loss with respect to 
some loss function.  If so, the reported value necessarily depends on the loss function used; the mean under square 
loss, the median under absolute loss, and so on.  
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the respondents.  The strong variation with age echoes Figure 5; the predicted value of q 
decreases by over $250 dollars for every one-year decrease in age.  The other covariates mainly 
have little predictive power.  It appears, however, that non-Hispanic African Americans tend to 
be much more uncertain about their future benefit levels than do members of other ethnic groups. 
 
4.2. Face-To-Face Interview Data 
 
In this section, we analyze survey responses obtained from 49 staff members at a 
midwestern university.  The face-to-face interviews provide two important kinds of information 
not obtained from the SEE respondents.   First, they provide respondents’ expectations regarding 
the magnitude of current Social Security benefits.  Second, they provide responses to open-ended 
questions through which we seek to learn about respondents’ information sources and thought 
processes. 
 
Sample Size and Response Rates 
Originally, 123 individuals were randomly selected from the university’s staff directory 
and were solicited by e-mail to participate in a study of perceptions of the Social Security 
retirement system and its future.  The message stated that the face-to-face interview would take 
no longer than 20-30 minutes and that $15 compensation would be paid.  Forty percent of the 
persons solicited (49/123) agreed to be interviewed.  The persons interviewed responded to  20
essentially all of the questions posed.
16 
Although the face-to-face survey suffered none of the item response problems 
encountered in the SEE telephone interviews, it did run up against another problem that SEE 
largely avoids.  As noted in Section 3.2, respondents to the face-to-face survey were asked to 
report probabilities that Social Security benefits exceed a series of predetermined thresholds 
ranging from $5,000 to $25,000, rather than the SEE series of person-specific thresholds 
generated by responses to the earlier questions on smallest and largest possible benefits.  We 
found that some of the 49 respondents place high probability on benefits exceeding our top 
threshold of $25,000.  We were able to estimate the subjective distributions of these respondents 
poorly, if at all. 
 
Expectations of Maximum Current Social Security Benefits: Central Tendencies 
  We measure expectations of current benefits by eliciting respondents’ subjective 
distributions of the amount now paid to a 70-year-old retired worker who is “eligible for the 
maximum social security benefit” after retiring at age 65.  We were able to estimate subjective 
distributions for 43 of the 49 respondents.  We were not able to estimate distributions for the 
remaining 6 respondents, each of whom reported a 100 percent chance that the current maximum 
exceeds $25,000. 
Among the 43 respondents with fitted subjective distributions of maximum benefits, the 
cross-sectional median value of the subjective median is about $18,500.  The cross-sectional 
                                                 
16 Two respondents declined to report the smallest and largest possible Social Security benefits that they might 
receive at age 70.  However, these and all other respondents did answer the subsequent sequence of questions asking 
for the probability that their benefits would exceed various predetermined thresholds. 
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median of respondents’ point “best estimate” of the maximum benefit is $16,000 for these 43 
respondents, and $18,000 for all 49 respondents.  Based on information available from the Social 
Security Administration, we calculate the actual value of the maximum benefit to be $16,860.
17 
Thus, the central tendencies of respondents’ expectations tend to be reasonably in line with the 
facts. 
In Section 4.1, we noted the absence of empirical evidence on how persons choose point 
estimates for quantities about which they are uncertain (see footnote 14).  We can shed a bit of 
light on this matter by comparing the subjective medians and best estimates reported by the 43 
respondents for whom we have complete data.  Figure 6 displays the 43 pairs of (subjective 
median, best estimate) values.  The reader should focus on the cases in which the subjective 
median is greater than our lowest threshold of $5000 and less than our top threshold of $25,000.  
In this region, a forty-five degree line through the origin provides a reasonably good overall fit to 
the data, with residuals that rarely exceed $5000. 
 
Expectations of Maximum Current Social Security Benefits: Uncertainty 
Figure 7 displays the subjective interquartile ranges of respondents’ subjective 
distributions, along with their subjective medians.  The striking conclusion is that respondents 
tend to be very uncertain about the current maximum benefit, with most values being above 
$5000, and many being above $10,000.  There is no evident association between respondents’ 
subjective medians and subjective interquartile ranges. 
                                                 
17  A person who retired in 1996 at age 65 and was eligible for the maximum benefit received $1248 per month at 
that time (see www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/exampleMax.html).   Application of the yearly cost-of-living-adjustment 




Expectations of Own Future Benefits and of Maximum Current Benefits 
  Figures 8 and 9 compare respondents’ expectations of maximum current benefits with 
their expectations of their own future benefits.  Figure 8 plots respondents’ subjective medians 
for these two quantities, while Figure 9 plots their subjective interquartile ranges.   
Figure 8 shows a clear positive relationship between the two subjective medians.  In most 
cases, the data lie somewhat below the 45-degree line, indicating that respondents expect their 
own benefit to be smaller than current benefits.  This makes sense for two reasons.  First, should 
the future formula remain the same as today’s, some respondents may believe that their life-cycle 
earnings will not qualify them for the maximum benefits.  Second, to the extent that respondents 
believe the future formula will differ from today’s, the tenor of the recent public discussion of 
Social Security makes it reasonable to expect that benefits will fall rather than rise. 
Figure 9 offers a glimpse of the relationship between “formula uncertainty” (i.e., 
uncertainty about the current amount paid to a retired worker with a specific earnings history) 
and the total uncertainty an individual perceives about benefits to be paid at age 70, conditional 
on eligibility.  The latter uncertainty includes not only formula uncertainty, but also earnings 
uncertainty and uncertainty about the future structure of the system.  The figure indicates a weak 
positive relationship between formula uncertainty and total uncertainty.  However, we do not 
find that total uncertainty generally exceeds formula uncertainty.  As often as not, the 
interquartile range of maximum current benefits exceeds that of own future benefits. 
 
Open-Ended Responses 
  In response to open-ended questions, subjects described for us their understanding of the  23
Social Security system, as well as the information on which their understanding is based.  The 
dominant source of information reported by respondents is the annual statement that workers 
now receive from the SSA. Fully 43 of the 49 respondents indicated that they based their 
expectations on SSA mailings, with the majority clearly describing the annual report.  Other than 
these documents, no strong pattern emerged.  Several respondents indicated that they infer the 
level of benefits from observation of or conversations with relatives or acquaintances currently 
collecting benefits. 
Our introduction to the module on future benefit expectations informed respondents that 
current benefits are “determined by retirement age and by earnings prior to retirement.”  When 
later asked to describe the factors that currently determine benefits, more than half of the 
respondents indicated a link between earnings histories and benefits.  However, the responses 
rarely suggested a full understanding of the formula.  Some respondents expressed a belief that 
benefits are based on earnings at retirement or over the preceding few years, as is common in 
employer-provided defined-benefit pension plans.  Six respondents expressed a belief that 
benefits are mean-tested, and one speculated that benefits would be means-tested in the future. 
 
 
5. Simulating the Impact of Social Security Policy on Retirement Savings 
   
In this section we use the decision model of Section 2 and the empirical findings of 
Section 4 to simulate how Social Security policy may affect retirement savings.  It would be too 
much to claim that this simulation exercise provides credible forecasts of policy impacts – the 
model of Section 2 is much too idealized and the findings of Section 4 provide only part of the  24
empirical knowledge necessary to enable realistic forecasts.  We perform the simulations 
primarily to illustrate how our empirical analysis of expectations data may be used to predict the 
behavioral responses to revisions to the Social Security system.  We also think that the 
simulations provide some insight into the potential direction and magnitude of these responses.  
Section 5.1 describes the simulation scenarios and Section 5.2 reports the findings. 
 
5.1. Simulation Scenarios 
 
Maintained Assumptions 
  The simulations performed here suppose that period 1 and period 2 are of the same 
length.  One way to think of the simulations is to imagine a person of age 45 who will work until 
age 65 and then live in retirement until age 85; then each period is 20 years in length.  Suppose 
that this person has not saved for retirement prior to age 45.
18  At age 45, the person knows that 
he will receive income y1  ≡  Y1/20 each year until retirement and decides on some fixed annual 
allocation of this income between consumption and retirement savings.  For simplicity, suppose 
that the savings allocated each year must be consumed exactly 20 years later; that is, retirement 
savings allocated at age 48 will be consumed at age 68, and so on.  These assumptions allow us 
to describe scenarios entirely in terms of annual income, consumption, and savings; annual 
quantities are simpler to think about than are the corresponding quantities expressed in terms of 
20-year periods. 
We consider a person who discounts the future at one percent per year and whose utility 
                                                 
18 One may instead think of first-period income Y1 as inclusive of accumulated savings.  Alternatively, we could 
change the model by adding accumulated pension savings that cannot be spent in period 1.   25










c u ;     γ   = 4;       β  = 0.99, 
 
where c is consumption in a given year and u(.) is annual utility.  These preference assumptions 
are motivated in part by the findings of Barsky et al. (1997) and Carroll (2001).  Analyzing 
responses to hypothetical choice questions in the HRS, Barsky et al. (1997) report that a majority 
of respondents do not discount future consumption and that almost two-thirds make choices 
consistent with a value of γ  that exceeds 3.76.  The specific value γ   = 4 is within the range 1 – 5 
that Carroll (2001, p. 28) states is “generally considered plausible.”  Abel (2001) uses the 
discount rate of 1 percent per year and considers a period that is 25 years long.  
We consider persons whose pre-tax income is either $80,000 or $25,000 per year. 
Applying reasonable tax rates and employer contributions to a retirement plan, these amounts 
imply net incomes of $55,000 or $20,000, respectively.  We use the pre-tax incomes to calculate 
OASDI taxes and to specify amounts to be placed into personal retirement accounts. 
 
Baseline Expectations Assumptions 
We use the empirical findings of Section 4.1 to specify baseline values for the subjective 
distribution P(y2) of annual Social Security benefits.  We consider someone early on in the first 
period, specifically at age 50.  These respondents were asked to report expectations for benefits 
20 years hence, at age 70.  Figure 2 shows that, among such persons, the median subjective 
probability of eligibility for benefits is 0.75.  Figures 4 and 5 show that, among such persons, the  26
median values of m and q are about $10,000 and $7,000 respectively. For the person with net 
income of $20,000 per year, we use these values of (m, q) to specify Social Security benefit 
expectations prior to any change in Social Security policy. For the person with net income of 
$55,000 per year, we specify larger baseline values of (m, q), namely ($16,000,  $9,600).
19     
  Specification of the distribution P(y2) does not suffice to express expectations; we need to 
specify expectations for stock market returns r
m as well.  To simplify the simulations, we 
suppose that y2 and r
m are subjectively statistically independent; that is, P(y2, r
m)  = P(y2)P(r
m).  
Furthermore, we consider a person for whom the subjective distribution of the annualized rate of 
return is uniform on the discrete values 
     } 10 . 0 , 08 . 0 , 07 . 0 , 06 . 0 , 05 . 0 , 04 . 0 , 03 . 0 , 02 . 0 , 01 . 0 , 01 . 0 {− . 
The subjective means of the annual and cumulative rates of return over the 20-year period in 
which savings are set aside are therefore specified to be 4.5% and 186%, respectively.
20  The 
risk-free annual rate is assumed to be 1.0%, yielding a cumulative return of 22% over the 20-year 
period.
21 Thus, the annual equity premium is specified to be 3.5 %, and the subjective probability 
that equity returns will fall short of the risk-free rate over the 20-year span is just 0.10. 
 
                                                 
19 These amounts were chosen to approximate the SEE estimates of the median values of (m, q) for persons with 
pre-tax incomes of $25,000 or of $80,000. These estimates are ($9,100, $6,800) and ($15,500, $9,600), respectively. 
20 This subjective distribution is chosen to approximately yield the findings of Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001), 
who assume that the log level of a diversified portfolio (60% S&P 500 index and 40% Salomon Brothers corporate 
bond index) follows a random walk with drift. They choose a mean return of 5.5% with a standard deviation of 
12.5%.  Our discrete distribution approximates such a process over a 20-year span, but with a mean annual return of 
4.5% and a standard deviation of 15.0%. 
21 Abel (2001) uses a risk-free rate of 1.19%.  Note also our specification follows the convention that β =(1+r
f)
-1.  27
How Policy Affects Expectations 
  We suppose that changes in Social Security policy affect P(y2), but not P(r
m).  We 
consider two policy changes, which could be implemented separately or in combination.  These 
are: 
(a) A lockbox proposal that removes the threat of system collapse.  Specifically, we suppose that 
the policy change increases the person’s subjective probability of eligibility for benefits but 
does not change his subjective distribution of benefits conditional on eligibility. 
(b)    A private investment proposal that places 5 percent of pre-tax earnings in a personal 
retirement account mutual fund bearing real rate of return r
m.  The remainder of the OASDI 
taxes (i.e., 7.4% of pre-tax earnings) is used to fund continuation of the current defined-
benefit program.  Under this proposal, the person’s subjective probability of eligibility for 
defined benefits remains as at present, whereas the defined contributions placed in personal 
retirement accounts are perceived to be available with certainty (i.e., fully vested).  The 
subjective distribution of defined Social Security benefits, conditional on eligibility, is 
specified to be log-normal with median m
124 . 0
074 . 0
⋅ .  The interquartile range is specified to be 




(c)  A proposal that combines proposals (a) and (b). 
 
5.2. Simulation Findings 
  28
  The simulation findings are presented in Table 3.  The left panel of the table specifies 
eighteen different scenarios.  Each scenario is defined by 
•  a value of net annual income while working ($55,000 or $20,000) 
•  a log-normal subjective distribution of Social Security defined benefits conditional on 
eligibility (parameterized by values for m and q) 
•  a subjective probability of eligibility for benefits (0.75; 0.90; or 1.00) 
•  a dollar amount per year of OASDI taxes placed in a private investment account ($0; $4,000 
or $1,250). 
The cumulative impact of the policy changes on benefits expectations may be ascertained from 
the columns that report five quantiles of the subjective unconditional distribution of the Social 
Security benefit portfolio, which is composed of both the defined-benefit and the defined-
contribution components.  The last three columns of the table report the optimal annual 
consumption and savings in each scenario. 
This table nicely summarizes how specified policy changes could affect the social 
security expectations and consumption/savings decisions of some hypothetical agents. Clearly, 
simulations could be conducted for persons with other characteristics, perhaps for each member 
of the SEE sample. However, such an analysis would push the model and the available data more 
than we believe is justified, and the results could not be presented so succinctly.  We believe that 
performance of more extensive simulations aiming to predict the population distribution of 
consumption/savings decisions can potentially do much to inform the design and evaluation of 
social security policy.  However, we think it prudent not to perform such simulations until richer 
data on expectations can be collected and joined with more realistic behavioral models.   29
Person with $55,000 Net Annual Income 
Simulations (1) through (6) consider the person who earns $55,000 net annual income 
while working.  Under the baseline simulation (1), this person consumes $35,900 per year while 
working and allocates $19,100 to savings, with $13,600 placed in the mutual fund and $5,500 in 
the risk-free asset.  Simulations (2) and (3) consider the lockbox proposal and suppose that, as a 
consequence, the person raises his subjective probability of eligibility from 0.75 to 0.90 or to 
1.00.  The result is that consumption while working rises from $35,900 to $37,400 or $39,600 
respectively.  Total savings must, of course, decline commensurately.  Nevertheless, savings 
placed in the mutual fund actually rises, from $13,600 to $14,000 or $15,400 respectively.  Only 
savings in the risk-free asset falls, from $5,500 to $3,600 or $0 respectively. 
  Simulations (4) through (9) include investment of $4,000 of OASDI taxes in a personal 
retirement account mutual fund.  At the same time, the median of the subjective distribution of 
defined benefits, conditional on eligibility, falls to about $9,500. The optimal allocation does not 
vary much with respect to variation in the subjective interquartile range, which is specified to 
either stay fixed at $9,600 or decline proportionately to about $5,700.  Either way, the reduction 
in the amount of discretionary savings placed in the mutual fund does not fully offset the 
mandated $4,000 investment, falling by $2,300 to $3,500.  When the individual is certain of 
benefit eligibility, first-period consumption falls slightly relative to the baseline scenario, by just 
$100 or $300.  When benefit eligibility is uncertain, first-period consumption rises by $1,000 to 
$1,700.  Thus, the offset of risky investment is greater when eligibility for regular benefits is 
more likely, whereas the consumption increase is greater when benefit eligibility is less likely. 
  When considering these results, it should be noted that the changes to Social Security 
policy affect both the central tendency and spread of the Social Security benefit portfolio (i.e.,  30
defined benefits and personal retirement account funds).  Our parameterization of the lockbox 
policy simply removes the lower tail of the distribution, which clearly increases expected utility 
as it increases the central tendency and decreases uncertainty.  Our mixed DB-DC scenario also 
increases the expected value of the portfolio while, in some cases, decreasing indicators of   
uncertainty such as the interquartile range. 
  
Person with $20,000 Net Annual Income  
Simulations (10) through (18) consider the person who earns $20,000 per year while 
working.  Under the baseline simulation (10), this person consumes $13,300 per year while 
working and allocates $6,300 to savings, with $4,600 placed in the mutual fund and $2,100 in the 
risk-free asset.  Simulations (11) and (12) consider the lockbox proposal and suppose that, as a 
consequence, the person raises his subjective probability of eligibility from 0.75 to 0.90 or to 
1.00.  The result is that consumption while working rises from $13,300 to $14,000 or $15,500 
respectively. The increase in consumption comes almost entirely out of risk-free savings.  
  Simulations (13) through (18) include investment of $1,250 of OASDI taxes in a personal 
retirement account.  Once again, the reduction in discretionary mutual fund investment does not 
fully offset the mandated investment, and, relative to the corresponding baseline scenario, first-
period consumption increases when eligibility is uncertain but decreases when eligibility is 
certain. 
Observe that under the expectations assumptions of scenarios (16) through (18), Social 
Security proposals with a personal retirement account component yield subjective distributions 
of benefits that are in some respects inferior to the distributions in scenarios (10) through (13), 
which assume continuation of the present defined-benefit system.  This contrasts with our  31
findings for the person with $55,000 income, for whom the investment-based system shifts the 
entire upper half of the subjective distribution to the right by at least several thousand dollars; 
compare scenarios (7) through (9) with scenarios (1) through (3).  Thus, we forecast that moving 
from a pure defined-benefit system to one combining defined benefits and defined contributions 
could have regressive distributional effects.  According to Feldstein and Liebman (2001), 
advocates of a mixed system argue that these effects may be offset by increasing the defined-
benefits component so as to redistribute some gains from higher to lower income individuals.  
We have not simulated such a policy. 
 
Subjective Benefit Uncertainty and Objective Benefit Outcomes 
  We have viewed the behavioral response to Social Security policy changes through the 
lens of an idealized model of retirement savings decisions.  The decision makers in our 
simulations, like the respondents to the SEE, perceive a substantial probability of receiving no 
benefits after they retire.  Therefore, policies that ensure receipt have the potential to greatly 
enhance subjective expected utility. 
We have considered two such policies—the Social Security lockbox and personal 
retirement accounts.  In our simulations, these policies tend both to increase the central tendency 
of benefit expectations and to reduce uncertainty via elimination of perceived risks of zero 
benefits.  Such perceived welfare enhancing properties suggest that these policy reforms would 
receive widespread public support. 
It is important to keep in mind that subjective benefit uncertainty need not correspond to 
objective risks.  The benefit distributions shown in Table 3 are subjective in nature, not 
objective.  Whereas individuals fearful of a collapse of the system may perceive high  32
probabilities of zero benefits, these subjective expectations may not reflect political realities. 
Whereas individuals may not fully understand the formula now used to compute benefits, policy 
makers face no such uncertainty.  For these and similar reasons, the benefit distributions shown 
in Table 3 may not accurately portray the benefits that persons would actually receive under 





  The empirical findings reported in Section 4 add substantially to the rather limited 
empirical evidence that was previously available on Social Security expectations.  The SEE 
findings on the variation of expectations with age are particularly interesting.  We found that 
younger persons tend to be much less confident than older ones that Social Security will continue 
to exist when they retire.  We estimate the median subjective probability of eligibility for 
benefits to be 0.40 at age 30, 0.50 at age 40, 0.75 at age 50, 0.95 at age 60, and 1.00 at age 65.  
We also found that, conditioning on continued existence of the system, younger persons and 
older ones both tend to expect that benefits will remain near current levels.  Hence the prevalent 
concern among younger persons appears to be that the Social Security system will collapse 
entirely, not that benefits will be reduced. 
Also notable is the extent of uncertainty about benefit levels.  The SEE data show that 
even middle-aged persons who are nearing retirement tend to have large subjective interquartile 
ranges for their future benefit levels, conditional on eligibility.  These persons face relatively 
little uncertainty about their future labor earnings or about the future structure of the Social  33
Security system, so the main source of their uncertainty about benefits must be uncertainty about 
the formula determining current benefits.  Our face-to-face interviews provide direct empirical 
evidence that formula uncertainty is substantial. 
The expectations data analyzed here provide some of the empirical evidence necessary to 
forecast how proposed changes in Social Security policy would affect retirement savings.  The 
simulations performed in Section 5 provide some sense of the impacts that may occur, but 
realistic forecasting of policy impacts requires other empirical evidence (as well as a less 
idealized decision model).  For one thing, we need to know the expectations that persons hold for 
the returns to private savings.  For another, we need to understand how changes in policy would 
affect the expectations that persons hold.  And, of course, forecasting savings decisions requires 
empirical evidence on preferences.  34
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 Variable  sample mean sample mean sample mean
Age (years) 42.3 42.3 42.3
Female 0.515 0.490 0.563
In Labor Force  0.802 0.817 0.773
High School Graduate  0.927 0.948 0.886
Bachelor’s Degree or More 0.411 0.424 0.386
White, Non-Hispanic  0.802 0.831 0.745
African-American, Non-Hispanic 0.072 0.067 0.081
Married and Residing with Spouse 0.539 0.559 0.501
Widowed 0.035 0.035 0.035
Cohabiting with Partner 0.067 0.060 0.082
All Age Eligible    
(1425 observations)
Respondents            
(935 observations)
Non-Respondents    
(490 observations)
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Survey of Economic Expectations 1999-2001
Other than Age, all variables are dichotomous indicators (=1 if yes).Age (years) 1.42 1.65 66.20 -253.21
(0.11) (0.11) (34.59) (35.74)
Female -7.50 -3.30 -2929.89 428.42
(2.39) (2.72) (937.80) (627.19)
Labor Force Participant -1.25 -1.10 1169.09 819.63
(1.93) (3.42) (1114.75) (896.40)
-3.01 -2.21 2315.66 153.99
(3.28) (3.98) (1122.79) (804.11)
0.00 2.76 2634.96 1001.50
(3.22) (3.51) (1164.79) (830.90)
White, Non-Hispanic 2.27 0.71 2021.71 1104.16
(4.08) (7.76) (1737.73) (1467.01)
2.44 1.26 2194.33 4609.23
(6.50) (9.88) (2309.87) (2427.46)
-4.66 -3.86 -308.84 1248.94
(2.64) (2.96) (900.39) (734.27)
Widowed -0.57 -0.55 1329.95 1228.83
(5.08) (3.38) (2452.33) (1178.72)
Cohabiting with Partner -5.23 -9.21 885.97 -826.28
(8.34) (7.15) (2331.92) (2785.09)
Intercept 8.64 -7.64 4025.37 15685.50
(7.54) (10.58) (2641.77) (2878.48)
1277 871 745 745 Number of Observations
Median m of Benefits 
($), Conditional on 
Eligibility 
IQR q of Benefits 
($), Conditional on 
Eligibility Predictor Variable
Married and Residing 
with Spouse
Table 2. Best Linear Predictors of Social Security Expectations: LAD Estimates
Some School After      
High School
Bachelor’s Degree or 
More
African American,       
Non-Hispanic
Percent Chance of 
Eligibility at Age 70 
(all respondents)
Percent Chance of 
Eligibility at Age 70 
(respondents with 
complete data)
Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses. Other than Age, all predictors are dichotomous.Net Annual 
Income Consumption
Y1 mq 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 C1 S
m S
f
(1) 55 16.00 9.60 0.75 0.00 0.0 0.0 13.3 19.3 26.0 35.9 13.6 5.5
(2) 55 16.00 9.60 0.90 0.00 0.0 10.5 15.1 20.7 27.3 37.4 14.0 3.6
(3) 55 16.00 9.60 1.00 0.00 9.1 11.9 16.0 21.5 28.1 39.6 15.4 0.0
(4) 55 9.55 9.60 0.75 4.00 7.2 12.1 18.6 26.9 36.1 37.5 11.1 6.4
(5) 55 9.55 9.60 0.90 4.00 9.6 13.9 20.2 28.8 37.8 38.4 11.4 5.2
(6) 55 9.55 9.60 1.00 4.00 11.1 15.2 21.4 30.0 38.8 39.2 11.9 3.9
(7) 55 9.55 5.73 0.75 4.00 7.2 12.8 18.5 25.3 32.4 37.6 11.2 6.2
(8) 55 9.55 5.73 0.90 4.00 10.6 14.6 19.6 26.3 33.6 38.5 11.7 4.8
(9) 55 9.55 5.73 1.00 4.00 12.3 15.6 20.5 26.8 34.3 39.5 12.4 3.1
(10) 20 10.00 7.00 0.75 0.00 0.0 0.0 8.0 12.4 17.6 13.3 4.6 2.1
(11) 20 10.00 7.00 0.90 0.00 0.0 6.1 9.3 13.5 18.6 14.0 4.6 1.4
(12) 20 10.00 7.00 1.00 0.00 5.2 7.1 10.0 14.1 19.2 15.5 4.5 0.0
(13) 20 5.97 7.00 0.75 1.25 2.3 4.8 8.1 12.5 18.9 13.8 4.0 2.3
(14) 20 5.97 7.00 0.90 1.25 3.8 5.8 9.1 13.8 20.4 14.3 4.1 1.7
(15) 20 5.97 7.00 1.00 1.25 4.8 6.7 9.9 14.5 21.2 14.8 4.4 0.8
(16) 20 5.97 4.18 0.75 1.25 2.3 5.2 8.4 11.5 14.9 13.8 4.0 2.2
(17) 20 5.97 4.18 0.90 1.25 4.5 6.6 9.1 12.2 15.5 14.4 4.2 1.5
(18) 20 5.97 4.18 1.00 1.25 5.7 7.3 9.7 12.6 15.9 15.1 4.8 0.1
Simulation 
Number
Table 3. Simulated Responses to Changes in Social Security Program and Benefit Expectations
Scenario*
Subjective Expectations of Social Security Benefit Portfolio
Quantiles of Unconditional 
Distribution of Social Security 
Benefit Portfolio











 Defined Benefits, 
Conditional on Eligibility Savings (S)
* Other model parameters are fixed across specifications and described in text.Conditional expectations estimated using gaussian kernel with bandwidth of two years (1425 observations).






















































]Conditional quantiles estimated using gaussian kernel with bandwidth of two years (1377 observations).
Figure 2. Quantiles of Probability of Receiving Social Security Benefits at Age 70,







































0.25-quantile* HRS: "Financially-knowledgeable" respondents who report "yes," "no," or "don’t know."  If currently receives benefits, "yes" is imputed.
Figure 3. Probability of "Yes" Response to Dichotomous Social Security Eligibility Question: 












53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
Age
SEE, simulated response with threshold probability of 0.5 
HRS, actual responses*Conditional quantiles estimated using gaussian kernel with bandwidth of two years (790 observations)
Figure 4. Quantiles of Subjective Median of Benefits at Age 70,



























































0.25-quantileConditional quantiles estimated using gaussian kernel with bandwidth of two years (790 observations).
Figure 5. Quantiles of Subjective IQR of Benefits at Age 70,


















































































0.25-quantileSource: 43 respondents to face-to-face interviews.






















































 >$30,000Source: 43 respondents to face-to-face-interviews. These interviews do not include branching algorithm used in the telephone interviews.  Benefit 
thresholds in probability questions range from $5,000 to $25,000.









































  >$40,000Source: 43 respondents to face-to-face interviews. 



















































  >$40,000Source: 43 respondents to face-to-face interviews. 



















































  >$40,000HRS   1998     SECTION  J:   ASSETS AND INCOME     PAGE  548 
FINAL VERSION 2     4/20/2001 
 
J50b1. In what year did your [husband/wife/partner] start to receive Social 
Security benefits? 
 
       DK    RF 
YEAR BEFORE 1996    YEAR 1996 OR LATER         
             
GO TO J51 
BRANCHPOINT           
 
 
[IWER: IF 1996, 1997, OR 1998, ASK:] 




01. JAN    02. FEB    03. MAR    04. APR    05. MAY 
         
06. JUN    07. JUL    08. AUG    09. SEP    10. OCT 
         
11. NOV    12. DEC    98. DK    99. RF     
 
 
J51 BRANCHPOINT:  IF R IS GETTING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS NOW (J46={1 or 3}), 
GO TO J55 
 
 
J51.  Do you expect to receive Social Security benefits at some time in the 
future? 
 
1.  YES   5.  NO  8.  DK  9.  RF 
          
  GO TO J55 BRANCHPOINT 
 
 
J52.  At what age do you expect to start collecting these benefits? 
 
    DK  RF 
AGE       
 
 HRS   1998     SECTION  J:   ASSETS AND INCOME     PAGE  549 
FINAL VERSION 2     4/20/2001 
 
J53.  If you start collecting Social Security benefits then, about how much do 
you expect the payments to be in today’s dollars? 
 
    DK  RF 
AMOUNT       
 





2. WEEK    3. EVERY TWO WEEKS/BI-WEEKLY    4. MONTH    5. LUMP SUM 
          
6. YEAR    7. OTHER (SPECIFY)    8. DK    9. RF 
 
 
J55 BRANCHPOINT:  IF R’s SPOUSE/PARTNER RECEIVES SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
(J46={2 or 3}) or IF R IS NOT PART OF A MARRIED/PARTNERED 
COUPLE, GO TO J59 
 
 
J55.  Does your [husband/wife/partner] expect to receive Social Security 
benefits at some time in the future? 
 
1.  YES   5.  NO  8.  DK  9.  RF 
          
   GO TO J59 
 
 
J56.  At what age does [she/he] expect to start collecting these benefits? 
 
    DK  RF 
AGE  
 
 HRS   1998     SECTION  J:   ASSETS AND INCOME     PAGE  550 
FINAL VERSION 2     4/20/2001 
 
J57.  If [she/he] starts collecting Social Security benefits then, about how 
much do you expect the payments to be in today’s dollars? 
 
    DK  RF 
AMOUNT          




2. WEEK    3. EVERY TWO WEEKS/BI-WEEKLY    4. MONTH    5. LUMP SUM 
          
6. YEAR    7. OTHER (SPECIFY)    8. DK    9. RF 
 
 
J59.  Did you (or your [husband/wife/partner]) receive any income last month 
from Supplemental Security Income, also called SSI? 
 
DEFINITION: SSI IS A PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION WHICH MAKES ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS TO LOW INCOME, BLIND, 
DISABLED, AND AGED PERSONS. A PERSON MAY BE RECEIVING EITHER OR BOTH 
SSI AND SOCIAL SECURITY CHECKS. 
 
1.  YES   5.  NO  8.  DK  9.  RF 
          
   GO TO J64 
 
 
J60 BRANCHPOINT:  IF R IS NOT PART OF A MARRIED/PARTNERED COUPLE, ASSIGN 1 FOR 
J60 AND GO TO J61 
 
 
J60.  Which one of you received income from SSI? 
 
1. RESPONDENT 
ONLY    2. SPOUSE/PARTNER 
ONLY    3.  BOTH  8.  DK  9.  RF 
 
 1425 respondents under age 70
1377 report valid % chance 48 do not give valid response
145 1232 report >0% chance
854 378 do not complete
817 37 do not complete sequence
790 27
4337 respondents under age 70 not collecting benefits
3745 report "yes" 592 do not report "yes"
3565 report valid age 180 do not report valid age
2412 1153 do not report valid amount report valid amount
Expected Amount of 
Benefit Payments
Expect to Receive 
Benefits
Expected Age When 
Start Collecting Benefits
responses used to fit 
subjective distribution
responses cannot be 
used to fit distribution
Response Rate to HRS (2000) Questions
Response Rate to SEE Questions








report 0% chanceCONTACT: Rona Blumenthal (410) 965-0163 for further information.
1 Includes parents and special age-72 beneficiaries.  Excludes 97,768 student beneficiaries aged 18-19.
2 Fewer than 500 beneficiaries.
Table 1.B3.—OASDI benefits: Number and average monthly benefit in current-payment status for adult beneficiaries, by type of 
benefit, sex, and age, March 2001
Type of benefit and sex
Number of beneficiaries (in thousands) Average monthly benefit
Total Under 62 62-64 65 or older Total Under 62 62-64 65 or older
Total 1.............................................................. 42,448 5,665 4,043 32,740 $797.54 $718.82 $752.98 $816.67
Retired workers......................................................... 28,628 . . . 2,620 26,008 846.48 . . . 776.61 853.51
Disabled workers....................................................... 5,083 4,401 683 . . . 787.37 776.30 858.75 . . .
Wives and husbands of retired workers.................... 2,782 48 312 2,423 429.59 322.15 402.91 435.13
Wives and husbands of disabled workers ................. 161 109 29 23 197.84 162.83 268.41 275.19
Nondisabled widows and widowers.......................... 4,668 131 318 4,219 812.57 768.31 776.14 816.69
Disabled widows and widowers................................ 202 145 56 . . . 520.12 521.13 517.51 . . .
Mothers and fathers................................................... 189 183 5 1 587.91 586.28 643.35 589.43
Disabled adult children ............................................. 731 647 19 64 519.63 522.99 533.26 481.38
Men 1............................................................... 18,198 2,857 1,795 13,546 930.14 816.69 939.08 952.89
Retired workers......................................................... 14,839 . . . 1,374 13,465 953.26 . . . 925.01 956.14
Disabled workers....................................................... 2,871 2,473 399 . . . 883.60 863.36 1,009.09 . . .
Husbands of retired workers..................................... 33 (2) 1 31 242.90 (2) 216.38 243.93
Husbands of disabled workers .................................. 4 2 (2) 1 155.94 125.36 (2) 195.95
Nondisabled widowers.............................................. 37 7 10 20 610.83 574.72 668.21 595.19
Disabled widowers.................................................... 5 4 1 . . . 363.09 365.82 352.26 . . .
Fathers....................................................................... 9 9 (2) (2) 495.84 495.75 (2) (2)
Disabled adult children ............................................. 400 362 10 28 517.32 520.00 526.92 478.95
Women 1.......................................................... 24,251 2,808 2,248 19,195 698.04 619.24 604.37 720.53
Retired workers......................................................... 13,790 . . . 1,246 12,544 731.57 . . . 612.99 743.35
Disabled workers....................................................... 2,212 1,928 284 . . . 662.48 664.65 647.73 . . .
Wives of retired workers........................................... 2,749 48 310 2,391 431.81 322.28 403.61 437.64
Wives of disabled workers........................................ 157 107 29 21 198.91 163.55 270.16 280.75
Nondisabled widows................................................. 4,632 124 308 4,199 814.18 779.43 779.61 817.74
Disabled widows....................................................... 197 141 55 . . . 524.32 525.75 520.67 . . .
Mothers ..................................................................... 180 174 5 1 592.57 590.96 645.71 592.74
Disabled adult children ............................................. 331 285 10 36 522.41 526.78 539.60 483.25